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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
El HHE ~OLIZ and 1 
VIDA LI~~ ~OLIZ, by Eddie Soliz, I 
lll'r Ouardian ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs alld Respondents, 
-YS.-
l•:ll\\'ARD \\'ILSON A:\IMERl\IAN )) 
BY His 0 uardian ad Litem, 
L~ Yerne Bruce Ammerman, and 
L.\ VEHXE BRUCE 
.\\I \llj~ H :\L\ ~' 
Defendants and Appellants. 1 
Case 
No.10028 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENTS 
STATEniENT OF CASE 
This action is, as outlined in Appellants' statement 
of ca~e, one which was brought to recover damages for 
personal injuries received in an automobile accident 
which occurred on l\Iarch 21, 1962, at the intersection 
of ~eeond \Yest and 200 North Street in Salt Lake City, 
l~tah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
"~ e agree as to the disposition in the lower court 
as outlined in . .:\. ppellants' statement as to the disposition. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief sought by plaintiffs and respondents on 
this appeal is for an Order affirming the judgment of the 
jury verdict and for an order affirming the lower court's 
denial of appellants' Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with appellants' State-
ment of Facts as far as they are presented. 
There are additional facts, however, which respond-
ent feels should be brought to the attention of the court, 
and we wish to point out the testimony upon which the 
jury apparently and justly based their verdict. 
Eddie Soliz testified throughout the trial that the 
problems, pain, and disability which he suffered and ex-
perienced following the accident were not present nor was 
he cognizant of them before the accident. (T 147- L 10) 
In fact, the entire testimony except an isolated incident 
of a pain in his back two years before the accident was 
to the effect that his problems of pain and suffering 
arose following the accident March 21, 1962. This is not 
only borne out by the testimony of l\Ir. Soliz, but is caus-
ally connected to the accident according to the testi-
mony and in the opinion of his neurosurgeon, D. C. 
Bernson. (T 41 L 16) Mr. Soliz tesetified that following 
the accident and over the next month or so his back, 
neck, arms, and hands would ache and that he . could 
hardly move them until he moved around for a while. 
(T 147-L 4) (T 149-L 11); that he was required to 
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wear a plastie neck collar (T 149 - L 23) (Also Ex-
hibit p;)) which he was required to wear for from six 
to .. ight weeks (T 150- L 18); that during a discogram 
opem t ion and examination, he was in terrific pain, thought 
he wn~ paralyzPd, was numb (T 152 - L 20); that fol-
lowing the disco gram he was ''pretty sore, lost his voice'' 
(T 1:-)~ - L 28) ; that his condition failed to improve as 
of the date of the trial (T 153 - L 14); that he was by 
n•aHon of his injuries unable to report regularly to his 
employment (T 1;)3 - L 19) having lost 172 hours of 
time from work. 
In addition to the pain and suffering experienced 
hy ~~ r. Soliz, as mentioned above, the uncontroverted 
tl'~timony of l\Ir. Soliz as to the disability he experienced 
from the date of the accident to the time of the trial 
wa~ that he was unable to walk as he did before the acci-
dPnt (rr 188- L 4), was unable to sit for any period of 
time without becoming restless requiring him to get up 
and moYe around ( T 188 - L 15), was unable to drive 
his ear for any long distances as he did prior to the acci-
dent (T 188- L 23), was nervous following the accident 
and which he was not before (T 189- L 4), he did not 
have the energy he had prior to the accident (T 189 -
L 10), his sleeping habits were different in that since the 
accident he was unable to sleep through the night and 
usually had to sleep by himself rather than waking up 
other members of his family by reason of his restlessness, 
he was unable to go to danees as he did before the acci-
dent (T 190- L 2), was unable to go camping, including 
fishing and hunting, as he did prior to the accident 
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(T 190- L 10), was unable to go on a planned vacation 
during the summer following the accident ( T 192 - L 9), 
was unable to do the normal yard work around his home 
which he did prior to the accident ( T 193 - L 17), and 
one of the most important items of damages in our opin-
ion is that following the accident :Mr. Soliz was unable 
to engage in the normal parental activities with his 
children, the normal association which a father enjoys 
particularly with sons of the age of the Soliz boys ( T 192 
- L 25) in that he was unable to play ball with them, go 
on canyon trips, take them to the gym, etc. 
Before plaintiff rested his case the court permitted 
plaintiff to recall Dr. D. C. Bernson, who had previously 
testified. We would like to point out that the substance 
of the evidence at the doctor's second appearance was 
merely the introduction of the X-rays (Exhibits P10 
through P15) (T 210 - L 14) and the polaroid expo-
sures (Exhibits 16 and 17) and his comparison of them 
with the X-ray (Exhibit D7) taken by Dr. Reed S. Clegg, 
defendants' witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT LIMIT-
ING DR. BERNSON'S TESTIMONY GIVEN 
UPON HIS SECOND APPEARANCE IN THE 
TRIAL TO THAT WHICH l\IIGHT BE CO~­
SIDERED A REBUTTAL OF ~IATTERS TES-
TIFIED TO BY DEFENDANT'S DOCTOR. 
We agree with appellant in his statement of the broad 
general rule respecting the order of proof, however, this 
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holds true only so far as is practicable and subject to 
great f!Pxihility and the order of the evidence is neces-
~mrily g-o\·PnlPd by the trial judge. We believe it to be 
hnsie und t lw eaHCH and textbooks abound with the rule 
that oiH' of the basic functions of the trial judge is to 
n'g-nlah.' the course of the trial and how such is conducted 
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is 
also hasie that before an appellate court can disturb a 
verdiet on this ground it must be clearly shown that 
~ut'h diserdion was abused or arbitrary. In re LeFrank's 
/-:state, :21-t- Pac. 2d 420; Hanks v. Christensen, ll Utah 2d 
~;State v. Bucharrl, 59 P. 468. 
\rhih, it is true the trial judge determines whieh 
party iH entitled or required to open the evidence it is 
not g·pnerally essential that the facts be introduced in 
any gin'n order. While the court may exercise discretion 
in thiH matter, as a general rule it will not interfere to 
control a party as to the order in which he shall intro-
duce hiH c·Yidence but will allow him to do so in the order 
in which he prefers. 53 Am. Jr. 102. Thus, we see that 
not only is it discretionary with the court but generally 
discretionary with a party as to the order of presenting 
his eddence. 
The purpose of a trial is to obtain justice between 
the parties and in so doing we believe it not only proper, 
but an incumbent duty on the part of the trial judge to 
afford all parties an opportunity to be fully heard. To 
have refused plaintiff the opportunity to recall Dr. 
Bernson would have been a manifest injustice and is gov-
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
erned by the sound discretion of the court. The rule whirh 
the courts have adopted is as stated in Vol. 6, P. 4950, 
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, and speaking of order 
and procedure: 
''Nevertheless the rules as to order of proof both 
with regard to the order of interrogating a par-
ticular witness and with the regard to the order 
of calling and interrogating witnesses generally 
are not strict. The difficulties and exigencies of 
getting competent proof of contested issues be-
fore the tribunal are such that hard and fast rules 
in this regard would result in the gravest injus-
tice. As one Court observes, ''all the competent 
and relevant testimony in a cause ought to be 
presented to the jury, and the order of its presen-
tation is often a secondary matter so justice is 
done." 
Ca,rter v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., South 
Carolina, 104 S.E. 186. 
and at page 4956 : 
"It is also within the discretion of the trial court 
to allow rebuttal evidence to be introduced, out of 
its order, in the examination in rhief although 
such evidence is anticipatory of the case to be 
presented by the other side.'' 
Neilson v. Mike Brown Stone Company, Utah, 69 
Pac. 289. 
and at page 4963: 
"In consonance with the broad discretion of the 
trial court as to the order in which evidence shall 
be presented and as to permitting the reopening 
of a case for the introduction of further evi-
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dPnce aftt•r the <'asp has been c.Iosed it is well 
t>stablished that it is within the discretion of the 
trial court as to whether a witness may be recalled 
and again examined subsequently to his first ex-
amination. Recall of a witness is frequently made 
neces~;ary by facts arising from the cross-exami-
na t.ion of other witnesses or by reason of inadver-
tan('e or from other causes and is usually allowed, 
in the sound discretion of the court although other 
pr<H'Pl'(lings have intervened. While discretion 
is sometimes too indulgently exercised in allow-
ing snrh recall, appellate courts do not interfere 
whether the request is allowed or refused unless 
discretion is c.Iearly abused.'' 
stating further at page 4966: 
... It is then said ·with reference to rulings on the 
admission of testimony: "It is firmly settled that 
the order of proof is committed to the discretion 
of the trial court, and it is seldom, if ever, that 
reversible error ran be predicted on this exercise 
of such discretion.'' 
Tlw same rule is stated in Vol. 98 P. 104 of Corpus 
Juris Secundum: 
"The matter of recalling witnesses ordinarily 
rests within the discretion of the trial court, Podol 
Y. Jacobs, 173 P. 2d, 75 E (Ariz.) Kelly v. People, 
~15 P. 2d 336 (Colo.) and under the facts and cir-
cumstances of particular cases, such discretion 
has been held not to be abused by permitting or 
refusing to permit the recall of witnesses: 
''The rules that the recall of a witness rests in the 
discretion of the trial court has been applied 
where it is sought to recall a witness in order to 
pepare a bill of exceptions, to explain or correct 
his prior testimony, to settle the testimony given 
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by the witness when previously testifying, to ex-
amine him as to new matter, or for the purpose 
of impeaching the witness. 
''The trial court may in its discretion permit a 
witness to be recalled after the case has been 
closed." People v. Reilly, 59 N.E. 1128 (N. Y.) 
Killer v. Alexander, 58 S.W. 637 (Tex.). 
The same rule is stated in Vol. 4 at Page 3936 in 
Nichols Applied Evidence: 
"It is within the discretion of the trial court to 
permit or refuse recalling of a witness previously 
examined either for further direct examination or 
for further cross-examination." State v. Rodre-
guiz, 167 Pac. 426. 
and at page 3937: 
"It is discretionary to permit or refuse recalling 
of witnesses to elicit a repetition of his former 
testimony.'' People v. MeN amara, 29 Pac. 953. 
In permitting the recalling of Dr. D. C. Bernson by 
the plaintiff in order for him to introduce X-rays which 
he had taken and to explain them to the jury the trial 
judge was acting within the discretion resting with him 
to regulate the course and conduct of trials and especially 
those which are being heard by a jury. In permitting the 
plaintiff to proceed as he did in this matter the trial 
judge was attempting to have the trial proceed in the 
most orderly and efficient manner as possible so that the 
jury would be more likely to understand the facts of the 
case and be able to render a just and adequate verdict. 
If there was any error on the part of the trial judge in 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pt>t'lllittiilg the recalling of Dr. Bernson, such error was 
not pn•judicial to the defendant in any way and would not 
ht> grounds for reversal. 
X o error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling 
or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties. U.R.C.P., Rule 61. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW X-RAYS RECEIVED AS 
E~XHIBITS IN THE CASE TO BE TAKEN TO 
THE JURY ROOM. 
Exhibits D7 -D9, inclusive, and exhibits P10-P15, 
inclusiYe, are negative exposures of X-ray photographs 
taken of the spinal column of plaintiff, Eddie Soliz. The 
first mentioned exhibits are side views of the cervical, 
thoracic and lumbar spine. (T 280) PlO is a lateral 
projection or Yiew of the dorsal-lumbar spine (T 335) 
and Pll-P13 are lateral projections of the cervical 
spine. (T 336) P14 and P15 are lateral projections, 
anterior-posterior (front to back), of the cervical spine 
at the time a dye was injected into the cervical discs for 
the purpose of obtaining a discogram (T 336) and P16 
and P17. which were taken within moments of P14 and 
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P-15, are positive polaroid exposures which are essen-
tially identical to the X-ray negatives P14 and P15. 
The positive exposures are black and white photographs 
of the type one is acquainted with in taking snapshots 
with a polaroid camera. 
At the time the case was submitted to the jury, the 
trial judge did not permit the X-ray negatives exhibits 
D7 -D9 and P10-P15 to be taken by the jury to be con-
sidered in its deliberation in the jury room. However, 
the jury was permitted to take with it P16-P17, the 
positive exposures of plaintiff's cervical spine. 
When counsel for defendant took exception to the 
court's refusal to permit all the X-rays to he taken by the 
jury to the jury room for its deliberation, the court re-
sponded as follows: 
By way of clarification on that matter, the Court 
might state for the record, it's this court's under-
standing that P16 and P17 were not photographs 
of the corresponding numbered X-rays, but were 
independent photographs taken on polaroid film 
which were taken independently of the X-rays of 
the same area and were then a matter of seconds 
and at most minutes apart from same. And it ap .. 
peared to the court that these polaroid positive 
photographs could at least to an extent be inter-
preted hy lay persons, to-wit: the jury; whereas 
X-rays themselves with or without a viewbox 
are almost impossible of intelligible interpretation 
by lay people, to-wit: a jury. (T239) 
Defendant insists that the trial court's refusal to permit 
all of the X-rays to go to the jury room was error. Plain· 
tiff disagrees. 
10 
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It is hornbook law that to regulate the course of busi-
ncs!-l during the progress of a trial is within the sound dis-
<'l'<'tion of the trial judge and there will not be a verbal 
rapping of his judicial knuckles by an appellate court 
unless thPrl' has lwen an abuse of that discretion. 53 .Am. 
Jur .. Trial § 34. Indeed, the trial judge must be recog-
nized as the auhority in charge of the trial and he should 
he allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the me-
chanics of procedure, and his rulings thereon will not be 
diRturlwd unless they are clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable and to the prejudice of the objecting party. 
llanks Y. Ch risfeHscn, 11 U. 2d 8, 354 P. 2d 564; State v. 
Buchard, 35 Or. 484, 59 P. 468; St. Louis Southwestern 
Ry. eo. , .. Mitchell, 115 Ark. 339, 171 S.W. 895; Zinn v. 
l•,'.r-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 306 P. 2d 1017. 
The Utah Statute relating to papers and exhibits 
taken hy the jury for deliberation in the jury room is con-
tained in Rule 47 (m) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
is as follows : 
Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take 
with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits and all papers which have been received 
as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion 
of the court, to be taken from the person having 
them in possession; and they may also take with 
them notes of the testimony or other proceedings 
on the trial taken by themselves or any of them, 
but none taken by any other person. 
It should be noted that the Utah Statute indicates that 
the jury may (emphasis added) take papers to the jury 
11 
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room, and that certain papers rnay be withheld from the 
jury that the judge, in his opinion, thinks ought not be 
taken from the person having custody and possession of 
same. By its terms the Utah Rule is permissive and 
not mandatory so that the trial judge is not required 
to send exhibits to the jury room but may do so, if in the 
exercise of his discretion, he thinks that the ends of jus-
tice will be attained by so doing. 
At Common Law, jurors were not permitted to take 
with them any unsealed papers introduced in evidence 
except with the consent of the parties, but the reasons 
for the rule have now disappeared and under the modern 
practice, it is the general rule in most jurisdictions, 
both in the absence of and also under statute, that when 
the jury retires to deliberate on their verdict, they may 
in the court's discretion take with them such books and 
papers as have been introduced in evidence. See 53 
Am. Jur., Trial, § 921 and 924 and the cases there cited. 
The court's action either in sending or refusing to 
send documents to the jury room will not be interfered 
with on appeal except in case of abuse. Sibley v. 1lfason, 
196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887; Sandel r. Stale, 115 S.C. 
168, 104 S.E. 567, 13 ALR 1268; overruled on another 
point in Sirrene v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 253, 128 S.E. 172. 
Insofar as the matter may be said in any manner to 
be governed by statute, it has been held that X-ray pho-
tographs constitute ''papers in evidence'' or ''written 
evidence'' within the meaning of statutes allowing such 
12 
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t>Vidl'IH'l' to be taken by the jury into the jury room when 
they retire to delilwrate the verdict. 
ehi(~ago & J. Electric R. Co. v. Spence, 213 Ill. 220, 
i~ ~.E. 796; Texas Employees bzs. Ass. v. Crow, 148 
TPx. 113, ~:n 8.\V. 2d 235, 10 ALR 2d 913 . 
.. \s the problem presented in Point II relates to X-ray 
photographs, plaintiff has been unable to find any case 
dealing with the point under discussion, i. e., there are no 
causes dealing with the trial judge's refusal to permit 
X-rays to go to the jury room. There are, however, sev-
eral cases that discuss the propriety of the trial judge 
permitting X-ray exhibits to be taken by the jury during 
its deliberation. All cases that have discussed the prob-
lem hold that the trial judge does not err if he permits 
the X-ray exhibits to be taken by the jury. See the 
annotation in 10 ALR 2d 918. 
However, there are no cases that hold that the trial 
judge m nsf permit such exhibits to be taken by the jury 
in order to prevent error. 
One case dealing with X-ray exhibits in the pas-
session of the jury, while different on its facts and pre-
senting a different problem, is of assistance in disposing 
of this case. In the case of Hasty Messenger Service v. 
Simpson (Okla.), 363 P. 2d 370, the jury obtained pos-
session of certain X-rays which were not properly ad-
mitted into eYidence. The improper X-rays were pho-
tographs of the plaintiff's injuries. There were other 
X-ray photographs tending to identify plaintiff's in-
juries which were properly introduced into evidence and 
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the jury took with it into the jury room both the improper 
X-rays and the competent X-ray exhibits. Defendant 
appealed from an adverse judgment assigning as error 
the possession and consideration by the jury of incom-
petent X-ray photographs. On appeal the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma held that the jury's possession of X-rays not 
properly admitted into evidence provided no grounds for 
reversal where the jury had other competent X-ray e,·i-
dence tending to identify the injury complained of and 
showing the connection between plaintiff and the injuries 
shown where defendant's medical witness complained 
mainly of the positioning of the head in the excluded 
X-rays and also differed to some degree as to the inter-
pretations of the excluded X-rays. 
On the basis of Rule 47 (m) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the general rule of law in most American juris-
dictions, and the facts of the case on appeal herein it is 
plaintiff's contention that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to permit all the X-ray exhibits to be taken by 
the jury into the jury room. Certainly, to insist that the 
trial judge must do so or be in error in light of the per-
missive terminology of the Utah Rule and the law gen-
erally is an attempt to negate the action of the lawyers 
and jurists who authored the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and to overthrow the rule of law establishrd in 
well reasoned cases in the majority of American juris-
dictions. Certainly, the jurors in the instant case were 
permitted to take the positive photographs of plaintiff's 
cervical spine ·with them into the jury room and in the 
exercise of his sound discretion, the trial judge ·was of 
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the opinion that a just result would more likely be reached 
hy the procedure followed than to permit all X-rays, 
negative and positive, to go to the jury room. Defendant 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the trial 
court 'H action in this matter, for no such abuse occurred. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
\Yhen taking exceptions to the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury, defendant took exception to the Court's 
failure to give all of defendant's requested instructions 
in the form and manner requested. Of the instructions 
that the Court did give, defendant took exception to a 
part of Instruction No 8 ( T 240). Instruction No. 8 in 
its entirety reads as follows: 
'' .:\ motorist who has the right of way need not 
anticipate sudden outbreaks of negligence on the 
part of other drivers. In fact, the failure to ob-
serve the happening of the negligent acts would 
be a proximate cause of the collision only when 
by observing, the motorist who had the right 
of way could have avoided the resulting collision. 
It is the duty of drivers entering an intersection 
to continue to observe the intersection and ap-
proaching vehicles throughout the time that they 
are entering and crossing the intersection. They 
should reappraise the relative positions of their 
automobile and any approaching automobiles and 
should proceed with reasonable care in view of 
such continuing re-appraisals and the information 
gained regarding speeds, distances, and relative 
positions of the automobile.'' 
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In objecting to the giving of said instruction coun-
sel for defendant stated (T 240, Lines 19-25) : 
''As to the Court's instructions which were ginm, 
I'll take exception to Instruction No. 8 specifically 
that part of No.8 which says "that a motorist who 
has the right of way need not anticipate sudden 
outbreaks of negligence on the part of other 
drivers'' in that the instruction seems to com-
ment on the evidence; seems to assume there was 
a sudden outbreak of negligence on the part of the 
defendant, and in that respect prejudices the 
jury." 
From the transcript it is apparent that defendant 
objected only to the first sentence of Instruction No. 8 
which is to the effect that a motorist who has the right 
of way need not anticipate sudden outbreaks of negli-
gence on the part of other drivers. Defendant assumes 
that when the Instruction was given the trial judge was 
telling the jury and the jury understood, that plaintiff 
had the right of way and defendant was guilty of a sud-
den outbreak of negligence when, in fact, a reading of 
a part of the instruction or a reading of the \Yhole .of it 
reveals that no such assumption is warranted. This is 
especially true when one realies that contributory neg-
ligence of plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, was submitted to the 
jury for this determination. 
Of importance in solving this problem is considera-
tion of two other Instructions which were given by thr 
trial judge. They are as follows : 
"Instruction No. 26: If during the trial the court 
has said or done anything which has suggested to 
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Yon that it is indinc>d to favor the claims or posi-
tion of either party, you will not suffer yourselves 
to he influenced by any such suggesetion. 
The court has not intended to express, nor to inti-
mate, any opinion as to which witnesses are, or 
are not, worthy of belief; what facts are, or are 
not, established; nor what inferences should be 
drawn from the evidence; nor which party should 
prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate 
an opinion relating to any of these matters, you 
should disregard it, because you are the exclusive 
judges of the facts.'' 
''Instruction No. 28: If in these instructions any 
rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying 
ways, no emphasis thereon is intended and none 
must be inferred by you. For that reason you 
are not to single out any certain sentence or any 
individual point or instruction and ignore the 
others, but you are to consider all the instructions 
as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has 
no significance as to their relative importance.'' 
By means of Instruction No. 26 the trial court prop-
erly told the jury that in all the things he said during the 
course of the trial he had not intended to comment on the 
credibility of witnesses or the weight of proof of facts 
and if it appeared to the jurors that this is what he had 
done it was unintentional and they were not to be in-
fluenced thereby and were to disregard it. 
In Instruction X o. 28 the jurors were advised that 
no emphasis on any facts of the trial was intended by 
the Instructions and that the jury was not to consider 
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or single out any particular Instruction and ignore oth-
ers, but it was to consider all the Instructions as a whole 
and in the light of all the others. 
After having instructed the jury and admonished 
it about the duty of the jury and about the law and espe-
cially after having admonished the jurors and instruct-
ing them to the contrary as it did in Instruction No. 26 
and No. 28, defendant argues that "The jury rnight 
(emphasis added) assume from that that the Court felt 
there was a sudden outbreak of negligence on the part 
of the defendant." (T. 240, Lines 26-28) The basis of 
the argument which infers that the jury did so assume 
because they might have done so is so tenons that one 
is disposed to think that defendant, with tongue in 
cheek, assigned Point III of his brief as error. An Ap-
pellate Court will not go on a "scavenger hunt" seeking 
reasons to reverse a trial court and the reviewing court 
will not reverse the lower court unless substantial 
grounds exist therefore, and such grounds are specifi-
cally called to the attention of the Appellate Court. 
The instruction complained of by defendant correctly 
states the law in this and the majority of American 
jurisdictions. Not only need not the driver of an auto-
mobile possessing the right of way over other vehicular 
traffic expect or assume sudden outbursts of negligence 
on the part of the operators of the other vehicles, but any 
person who is observing due care for his own safety has 
the right to assume that the operators of other vehicles 
are possessed of normal faculties of sight and hearing 
and that they will use them in exercising ordinary' care 
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for their own safety and the safety of others; and he 
ha:-; the right to rely on that assumption unless, in the 
l'XPrl'i~w of due care, he observes or should observe some-
thing to warn him to the contrary. Bryant v. Bingham 
Stage Ijinc, 60 Utah 299, 208 P 541; JIFU 16:10; BAJI 
:20:!-B . 
• \g-ain, a person who is exercising due care has a 
right to assume that others will also perform their du-
ties under the law, and he has a right to rely and act on 
that assumption unless, in the exercise of due care, he 
observes or should observe something to warn him to 
the contrary. In the absence of any such warning, it is 
not negligent for a person to fail to anticipate injury 
which can come to him only from a violation of law or 
duty by another. Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176 
P. :367, JIFU 16:12 BAJI 138. 
Furthermore, it would make no difference whether 
the act of negligence complained of was a sudden out-
burst or a normal, regular act, timewise, so long as it 
proximiately caused the injury complained of. Instruc-
tion X o. 8, then, applies to any and all drivers of motor 
vehicles and not to defendant only as argued. The law 
as embodied in the instruction was also applicable to 
plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, and it being couched in terms 
sufficiently general there can be no doubt that was what 
the trial court intended and that the jury so under-
stood it. 
Upon completion of the trial, in the chambers of the 
trial judge, and prior to the instruction of the jury, plain-
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tiff's attorney made two motions, together and in the 
alternative (T 233). The first motion was that the court 
direct a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs and against 
defendant Ammerman on the ground that defendant was 
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause 
of the accident. The second motion, in the alternative, 
was that the court find as a matter of law that defendant 
Ammerman was negligent as a matter of law and that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 
In response to palintiffs' motions counsel for de-
fendant stated (T. 234) : 
''I would consent to the granting of the alter-
native motion, that the Court might find as a mat-
ter of law that the defendant was guilty of neg-
ligence in making a left hand turn (emphasis 
added) and leave the issue of contributory neg-
ligence on the part of Mr. Soliz to the jury." 
Prior to the time that the jury was instructed in this 
matter counsel for defendant consented to a finding that 
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in 
making a left-hand turn, and after the jury was instruct-
ed, attorney for defendant objected to a part of In-
struction No. 8 on the ground that the jury might as-
sume (1) that plaintiff had the right of way, and (2) that 
defendant was guilty of a sudden outbreak of negligence. 
It seems apparent to plaintiffs that defendant, having 
consented to the finding of negligence against himself in 
making a left-hand turn, the instruction was not improper 
and in any event was not prejudicial to defendant. For if 
defendant was guilty of negligence in making a left-hand 
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turn it follows that he failed to yield the right of way 
to plaintiff, and defendant being negligent in making the 
left-hand turn it is immaterial whether the negligent act 
was a sudden outbreak or any other negligent act. 
Based upon the argument presented herein and the 
law cited in support thereof, plaintiff urges upon the 
rourt that Instruction No 8 given by the court was not 
an erroneous or improper statement of the law, and that 
in any event, it was not prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS NOT EX-
CESSIVE AND WAS NOT GIVEN UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJU-
DICE. 
We believe it to be patently basic that the peculiar 
province of the jury is the determination of questions 
of fact arising in the trial of the action in which it sits 
and that it exercises its province upon the evidence 
introduced. 
We believe further that one who has a grievance 
seeks legal redress, presents his case to a court or jury 
and receives a verdict after a fair trial that all presump-
tion revolve in the favor of the validity of all matters 
determined. Joseph v. L. D. S. Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 
348 Pac. 2d 935. 
In the instant case the jury determined the plaintiff 
was entitled to and returned a verdict of $15,000.00. 
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As stated many times by this court, there is no fixed rule 
by which to measure the amount of damages to be award~ 
ed for pain and suffering and the matter is properly left 
to the sound discretion of the jury. Further, that in 
assessing damages the jury can consider loss of wages, 
permanent disability, loss of bodily function disfigure-
ment, and prolonged pain and suffering. This in sub-
stance is what the court instructed (Instr. 16) and we 
must conclude, by reason of the presumption in the pre-
vailing parties' favor, what the jury considered in arriv-
ing at its verdict. The evidence is substantial to justify 
the finding of the amount in that the plaintiff has 
substantial amount of trouble in walking, sitting, 
driving, sleeping, dancing, camping, fishing, hunting, 
playing with his children, working in his yard, is 
nervous and has no energy. The jury might also have 
considered in addition to the actual time lost from the 
plaintiff's job his probable loss of income by reason of 
his inability to do the requirements of his job. Though 
his Civil Service rating had not decreased he was unable, 
by reason of his injuries, to do his job and was working 
at a job with a rating of one less. 
In addition to the above mentioned items which the 
jury could consider in assessing the plaintiffs' damages 
undoubtedly the jury also considered the testimony of 
Dr Bernson wherein he testified· that sooner or later an 
operation would become necessary to remove the rup-
tured or herniated discs ( T 45 - L 9). Such an opera-
tion to cost between $800.00 to $1,050.00 (T 46 and 27). 
The normal recovery period being about eighteen months 
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(T 47- L ~7) and leaving a residual permanent partial 
disability of from nine per cent to eleven per cent total 
bodily disfunction (T 48-L 12). 
Taking into consideration all of the evidence and 
tPstimony concerning damages we feel only one con-
elusion could be reached that being that the jury, in 
accordance with the Instructions, awarded a fair and 
just verdict and duly considered " ... the nature and 
l'XtC'nt of the injuries, the degree and character of the 
suffering ... its probable duration and severity ... pre-
vented from the ordinary affairs of life ... loss of earn-
ings or earning capacity which results from the injuries'' 
(Inst. 16) 
The law is well stated in the case of Paul v. J(irken-
dall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P. 2d 670, and which we believe sum-
marizes the major Utah cases concerning this point. The 
court states : 
"It is not enough, under this rule nor under the 
code provision which it supplanted, merely to al-
lege that the amount itself is excessive. The 
amount of the verdict is ordinarily a matter ex-
rlush·e ly for the jury and on the ground of ade-
quacy of the verdict alone, the court may not 
interfere with the jury's verdict unless is clearly 
appears that the award was rendered under mis-
understanding or prejudice.'' 
''There can be no fixed rule to measure the amount 
of damages to be awarded for pain suffered; the 
matter is properly left to the sound discretion cf 
an unprejudiced jury, Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 
rtah 88, 138 P. 1172, and the jury is allowed great 
latitude in assessing damages for personal injur-
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ies. Duffy v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., Utah, 218 P. 
2d 1080. The elements which the jury could prop-
erly consider in arriving at a figure '''hich, of 
course, can only approximate compensation to thC' 
plaintiff, are loss of wages, permanent disahil it~·. 
loss of bodily function, disfigurement and pro-
longed pain and suffering. Duffy v. Union Par. 
R. R. Co., supra.'' 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the facts as revealed in the record 
in this matter and the law as discussed herein, the negli-
gence of the defendant cannot be questioned and the se-
verity of the injuries to the plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, amply 
demonstrated, so that the verdict rendered in this mat-
ter by the jury was reasonable and just. 
The action of the trial judge in permitting the plain-
tiff to call witnesses in the order that it did and in per-
mitting certain exhibits to he taken to the jury room 
and refusing others to be taken are well within the dis-
cretion granted to the judge and his prerogative to de-
termine the course and conduct of the trial. Therefore, 
the jury verdict should remain undisturbed and the 
Order of the trial judge in denying defendant's Motion 
for New Trial affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
CARMAN E. KrPP, Esq .. 
TEL CHARLIER, Esq. 
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